A few years ago, it seemed that the entire industry was strongly backing FAST services (Free Ad-Supported Streaming TV). However, the latest audience data—and, more importantly, advertising revenue figures—show that reality is quite far from those initial expectations.

In hindsight, much of the enthusiasm surrounding FAST was driven by a set of very specific metrics, which acted as true siren calls for the industry.

The numbers that fueled the bubble

• Pluto TV (Paramount) announced in 2021 that it had reached $1 billion in annual advertising revenue, becoming the first major FAST success story. Since then, Paramount has stopped reporting standalone figures for the service, folding it into its broader DTC business. Most industry analysts estimate that Pluto TV’s revenues have remained stable or slightly above that level, but without exponential growth. Additionally, it is estimated that between 60% and 70% of those revenues are still generated in the U.S., which helps put its true global reach into perspective.
• Roku currently generates around $4 billion annually through its platform business, of which an estimated 70–75% comes directly from advertising, much of it linked to its FAST ecosystem and The Roku Channel. Yet the same pattern holds: over 80–85% of Roku’s revenues are concentrated in the U.S., with international monetization still relatively limited.
• Tubi (FOX) is arguably one of the strongest examples in terms of profitability and scale. It surpasses 100 million monthly active users (MAUs) , and in 2023 FOX reported advertising revenues close to $900 million. Since then, no detailed figures have been disclosed, but market consensus places Tubi close to—or slightly above—$1 billion annually. Once again, it is estimated that more than 75–80% of those revenues are generated within the U.S.

The pattern is clear: FAST performs well in the United States, but its ability to gain traction and monetize declines significantly outside that market.

As an additional data point, in 2022 it was estimated that around 65% of global FAST revenues were concentrated in the U.S. While this share has decreased slightly with international expansion, it still clearly defines the model’s center of gravity.

Why does this happen?

1. Market saturation and lack of differentiation

The FAST market is highly fragmented and, in many cases, saturated. The same content is replicated across multiple platforms, operating systems, and Smart TVs. This homogeneity makes meaningful differentiation difficult, reduces audience loyalty, and positions FAST as a low-engagement consumption model.

2. Misaligned original expectations

FAST was never conceived as a high-performance advertising model. Its original purpose was far more pragmatic: to generate incremental revenue from already amortized content, giving a second life to older or secondary catalogs. The problem arose when this complementary revenue stream was expected to become a core pillar of the business.

3. Advertiser perception of lower quality

This is not an opinion; it is a market reality. Just as in the early days of digital advertising—when many advertisers were willing to pay premium CPMs to be associated with specific publishers and premium media brands, while treating the so-called “long tail” as supplementary inventory with lower CPMs—FAST is still largely perceived, with a few notable exceptions, as lower-quality inventory. This perception directly impacts both CPMs and fill rates, limiting the scalability of the model.

4. Structural differences between the U.S. and Europe

The U.S. advertising market is larger, more liquid, and several years ahead in the adoption of advanced TV and CTV buying. This is compounded by a key structural difference: in the U.S., the absence of a strong equivalent to European free-to-air television, combined with the steady decline of cable, created a natural space for FAST to establish itself as a free, linear, and easy-to-consume alternative.

In much of Europe—particularly in markets such as Spain, France, Germany, Italy, or the UK—the situation is very different. Free video consumption is already well covered by a strong combination of Free-to-Air television and BVOD platforms operated by major broadcasters. These platforms offer local, current, and high-quality content, funded by advertising and backed by highly established brands for both viewers and advertisers. In this context, FAST does not fill a genuine market gap; instead, it competes directly with mature, efficient, and already well-functioning free models.

This asymmetry helps explain why FAST finds its strongest economic traction in the U.S. and why its international scalability—particularly in Europe—is far more limited.

5. The evolution of the advertising business model

The advertising business model has evolved significantly in recent years. Traditionally, in television, commercial relationships were direct: the advertiser—often through a media agency—negotiated directly with the channel or publisher. This created a transparent relationship and a clear flow of revenues.

Digital advertising has transformed many of these dynamics. Today, in many cases, the relationship between advertiser and publisher / media owner / broadcaster (collectively referred to as “publishers”). is no longer direct. Programmatic advertising has introduced new flows, intermediaries, and technologies, fundamentally changing how advertising is planned, bought, and measured. One of the most visible changes is the emergence of multiple players within the Ad Tech stack, each adding value through advanced targeting, campaign optimization, measurement, or fraud reduction.

At the same time, this added complexity means that advertising investment is distributed across multiple actors, reducing the share that reaches the publishers. While this is a broad topic deserving its own article, the reality is that these new layers have significantly altered publishers’ net revenues—even as programmatic advertising adds efficiency, reach, and value for advertisers.

Is there really an opportunity for FAST?

Yes—but not in the broad, generic format that many initially imagined. Opportunities emerge when the model is executed with strategic focus:

1. Highly targeted niche content

Thematic channels (anime, alternative sports, lifestyle, independent cinema) achieve higher engagement and, in some cases, higher CPMs thanks to more clearly defined and valuable audiences.

2. Closed and consolidated ecosystems

Some channels within platforms like Roku demonstrate that the combination of distribution, experience control, and advertising scale is critical. Here, value lies not only in the content itself, but in the closed ecosystem, where the platform can actively drive consumption toward those channels.

3.Strong brands with established communities

Cases such as Crunchyroll (Sony) show that a strong brand, with a clear identity and a loyal community, can successfully monetize through advertising even within free or hybrid models.

4. Branded content and transmedia strategies

FAST offers an interesting opportunity for branded content. Examples like the collaboration between Rakuten and Turismo de Canarias illustrate how entertainment and marketing can be integrated naturally, generating value beyond the traditional ad spot.

5. Controlled integration of UGC

Some platforms are experimenting with UGC, but not as an open model. UGC works when it is curated, scheduled, and contextualized, and when it responds to a clear strategy—whether focused on cost efficiency, younger audiences, or branded content—rather than simple volume. This is where an open question remains: are platforms truly betting on this type of content, or will it simply become yet another channel added to the already 5,000 existing ones?

Conclusion

FAST is not dead.

But it is also not the new El Dorado that many promised.

It works when understood as a complementary model, supported by clear niches, strong brands, or well-defined content strategies. The bubble was not FAST itself, but the expectation that the model could scale globally at the pace and margins of the U.S. market.

And that is a lesson the industry—especially outside the U.S.—is finally beginning to internalize.